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Miller: Miller: Coping with CAFOs:

Coping with CAFOs: How Much Notice
Must a Citizen Give?
Community Ass 'nfor Restoration ofthe Environment v. Henry Bosma Dairy'
I. INTRODUCTION
Like it or not, large-scale corporate "farms" are now a major part of our
nation's agricultural supply system. 2 Concentrated animal feeding operations
("CAFOs")3 have located in agricultural areas nationwide, often bringing
environmental contamination with them." Regulation of these facilities has

1. 305 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2002). The case has a rich history of reported lower court
decisions. See Cmty. Ass'n for Restoration of the Env't v. Henry Bosma Dairy, No. CY98-3011, 2001 WL 1704240 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 27, 2001), aff'd, 305 F.3d 943 (9th Cir.
2002) (ruling on penalty phase of Bosma trial); Cmty. Ass'n for Restoration of the Env't
v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 65 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (E.D. Wash. 1999), aff'd, 305 F.3d 943 (9th
Cir. 2002) (ruling on liability phase of Bosma trial); Cmty. Ass'n for Restoration of the
Env't v. Sid Koopman Dairy, 54 F. Supp. 2d 976 (E.D. Wash. 1999), aff'd, 305 F.3d 943
(9th Cir. 2002) (granting partial summary judgment as to all four related CARE/dairy
cases); Cmty. Ass'n for Restoration of the Env't v. DeRuyter Bros. Dairy, 54 F. Supp.
2d 974 (E.D. Wash. 1999), aff'd, 305 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2002) (allowing amicus curiae).
2. The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") estimates there to be
approximately 1.3 million farms with livestock in the United States, about 238,000 of
which involve confined conditions for the animals. Standards for CAFOs, 68 Fed. Reg.
7176, 7179 (Feb. 12, 2003). Such "agriculture enterprises where animals are kept and
raised in confinement" are called animal feeding operations ("AFOs"). Id. The EPA
recognizes "[t]he continued trend toward fewer but larger operations, coupled with
greater emphasis on more intensive production methods and specialization." Id. at 7180.
3. Generally CAFOs are the largest AFOs. See generally 40 C.F.R. § 122.23
(2002). In Missouri, Class IA CAFOs (the largest classification) are those having the
capacity for at least seven thousand "animal units." Mo. REv. STAT. § 640.703(3)
(2000). Missouri is currently home to twenty-one of these giants, which must obtain siteMissouri
specific permits. E-mail from Ogle Hopkins, Environmental Specialist III,
Department of Natural Resources, to Martin Miller (Mar. 25, 2003, 03:25:00 CST) (on
file with author). Class LB and IC CAFOs must also obtain permits, and typically qualify
for a general permit. Id. Class II facilities are generally considered AFOs, which may
voluntarily obtain "letters of approval" from the Department of Natural Resources. Id.
Class IIfacilities have the capacity for more than 300 animal units, but below that level
AFOs are not classified and are thus not directly tracked by the state. See Mo. REV.
STAT. § 640.703(6) (2000). The Department of Natural Resources has issued permits to
more than 400 AFOs and has a record of over 1,000 of them statewide, but clearly many
more exist. E-mail from Dann East, Environmental Engineer, Missouri Department of
Natural Resources, to Martin Miller (Nov. 18, 2003, 10:43:00 CST) (on file with author).
4. AFOs "annually produce more than 500 million tons of animal manure that,
when improperly managed, can pose substantial risks to the environment and public
health." Standards for CAFOs, 68 Fed. Reg. 7176, 7179 (Feb. 12, 2003).
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proven a formidable task for federal and state governments.' Generally, the
federal Clean Water Act ("CWA") prohibits the "discharge of a pollutant"'6 from
"point sources ' 7 into "navigable waters"' unless the discharger has obtained a
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit.9 To help
promote compliance, Section 505 of the CWA provides for citizen suits as a
means of supplementing governmental enforcement efforts.' But substantive
and procedural hurdles abound for citizens seeking to take on the role of "private
attorneys general" and enforce environmental laws when their government fails
to do so. This Note examines the largely successful efforts of one citizen
organization that sought to bring two Washington dairies into compliance with
the CWA.
Much of the controversy in this case centered around the CWA's sixty-day
"notice and delay" requirement, which is a prerequisite to filing a citizen suit.
This Note focuses on what constitutes sufficient notice and suggests how citizen
groups should handle additional violations discovered after suit has been filed.
5. The EPA has noted that "[d]espite more than 25 years of regulation of CAFOs,
reports of discharge and runoff of manure and manure nutrients from these operations
persist." Id. The EPA acknowledged that "these conditions are in part due to inadequate
compliance with and enforcement of existing regulations," but also cited a need to revise
its rules. Id. The EPA further aspired that its "final regulations being announced today
will reduce discharges that impair water quality by strengthening the permitting
requirements and performance standards for CAFOs." Id. Clearly the struggle continues.
See, e.g., Bosma Dairy, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 1149 (noting how the state of Washington
historically "lacked the resources to be proactive"); Missouri Department of Natural
Resources, Enforcement Actions Against Animal Production Facilities: 1982-August
14, 2000, at http://www.sierraclub.org/factoryfarms/rapsheets/missouri/dnredb.pdf
(Aug. 14, 2000) (listing completed enforcement actions in Missouri).
6. The terms "discharge of a pollutant" and "discharge of pollutants" broadly
encompass "any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source."
Clean Water Act § 502(12), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A) (2000). "Pollutant" is also defined
by the CWA. See Clean Water Act § 502(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2000).
7. The term "point source" basically includes any discrete location from which
pollutants are discharged (such as a drainage pipe), as well as CAFOs. See infra note 57
and accompanying text.
8. The term "navigable waters" is not limited to water bodies that are actually
capable of being navigated in the traditional sense. See infra notes 51-55 and

accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Miss. River Revival, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, No. 01-2511, 2003
WL 256734, at *1 (8th Cir. Feb. 7, 2003) (citing Clean Water Act §§ 301(a), 402, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1311 (a), 1342 (2000); Ass'n to Protect Hammersley, Eld, and Totten Inlets v.
Taylor, 299 F.3d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 2002); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304,

310-11 (1981)). The NPDES program is described in Section 402. See Clean Water Act
§ 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000).
10. See Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000).

II. See id. § 505(b)(1)(A).
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Although the Ninth Circuit had previously taken a fairly strict approach in
interpreting notice requirements, Bosma Dairy indicates a shift toward a more
forgiving approach by allowing the plaintiff to include certain non-noticed
violations in its lawsuit. This Note urges the continued movement away from a
rigid and formalistic approach.
II. FACTS & HOLDING
An environmental group named Community Association for Restoration of
the Environment ("CARE") brought a citizen suit against two Washington dairy
operations (collectively referred to as "Bosma"), alleging violations of the
CWA. 2 Each dairy stabled or confined at least 2,250 cows and otherwise met
the definition of a CAFO." CARE sought to hold Bosma liable for numerous
alleged discharges of pollutants and animal waste into "waters of the United
States"' 4 before obtaining an NPDES permit as required, and in violation of the
permit once it was finally obtained. 5 CARE sought to impose civil penalties on
Bosma, to obtain injunctive relief, and to collect attorney fees and costs. 6
Bosma's "long history of compliance problems" began shortly after the
dairy opened in 1973 with a citation from the Washington Department of
Ecology ("WADOE") for discharging waste manure into a drainage ditch that
eventually flows into the Yakima River. 7 Between 1976 and 1996, WADOE
unsuccessfully instructed Bosma to obtain an NPDES permit four times."8

12. Cmty. Ass'n for Restoration of the Env't v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d 943,
946 (9th Cir. 2002). CARE actually brought four different lawsuits involving dairies
before a federal district judge in Washington, who allowed the cases to be temporarily
consolidated for limited discovery purposes and for partial summaryjudgment regarding
common issues. Cmty. Ass'n for Restoration of the Env't v. Sid Koopman Dairy, 54 F.
Supp. 2d 976, 978 (E.D. Wash. 1999), aff'd, 305 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2002). The instant
decision by the Ninth Circuit involved only one of these lawsuits, in which Bosma was
a defendant. Bosma Dairy,305 F.3d at 946. Both the "Henry Bosma Dairy" and the
adjacent "Liberty Dairy" were owned and operated by Henry Bosma and "Bosma
Enterprises" (collectively referred to as "Bosma" in this Note). Id.
13. Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d at 946-47; see also Cmty. Ass'n for Restoration of the
Env't v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 65 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1145-46 (E.D. Wash. 1999), aff'd,
305 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing CAFOs during liability phase of trial); 40
C.F.R. § 122.23 (2002).
14. See infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
15. Bosma Dairy,305 F.3d at 946. For a brief discussion of NPDES permits, see
infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
16. See Cmty. Ass'n for Restoration of the Env't v. Henry Bosma Dairy, No. CY98-3011, 2001 WL 1704240, at *2(E.D. Wash. Feb. 27, 2001), af'd, 305 F.3d 943 (9th
Cir. 2002).
17. Bosma Dairy,305 F.3d at 947.
18. Id.
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During that time several complaints were made about other discharges, and
WADOE cited Bosma for those that were verified. 9 Bosma was finally issued
a General Dairy Permit ° on January 31, 1997, and almost a year later (on the
same day
CARE filed its lawsuit) this permit was modified to include the Liberty
21
Dairy.
CARE sent its notice of intent to sue on October 31, 1997, giving Bosma
more than the sixty days required by the CWA's citizen suit provision. 22 This
notice alleged twelve discharges, but Appendix B of CARE's complaint added
thirty-two more violations that were discovered after notice had been given.23

19. Id.
20. The CWA allows individual states to administer their own permit programs, as
long as such programs meet federal requirements and are approved by the EPA. Id.
Through WADOE, the state of Washington regulates dairies via a combined permit
which contains federal NPDES requirements as well as state requirements. Id. at 956.
Such General Dairy Permits (more fullynamed "Dairy Farm National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System and State Waste Discharge General Permits") incorporate a Dairy
Waste Management Plan. Id. at 947-48. Bosma's permit states that "[t]here shall be no
discharge of process waters to surface waters of the state, except for overflow" from
waste containment facilities resulting from a twenty-five year rain fall event. Id. at 948.
It also notes the possibility of a citizen suit. Id.
21. Id. at 947. This last minute inclusion prevented CARE's success on some of
its claims. See Cmty. Ass'n for Restoration of the Env't v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 65 F.
Supp. 2d 1129, 1153 (E.D. Wash. 1999), affd, 305 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that
because the NPDES permit was modified to cover the Liberty Dairy on the same date the
complaint was filed, the court was unable to include this as another ongoing violation).
22. Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d at 948. For general information regarding the citizen
suit provision, see infra notes 64-73 and accompanying text.
23. Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d at 948.
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The additional allegations included overapplication24 of waste to Bosma's land,
erosion of one.of its lagoons, and more illegal discharges."
CARE alleged three counts in its complaint: (1) operating and discharging
pollutants before obtaining a permit, (2) violating the permit, and (3) causing
violations of water quality standards.26 The district court resolved several
pertinent issues via summary judgment. It found that CARE's pre-suit notice
was adequate, that Bosma's dairies were CAFOs and thus point sources, and that
CARE could enforce both state and federal restrictions.27
At the liability portion of the trial, the district court ruled that CARE had
proven sixteen of the forty-eight alleged ongoing violations, and that at the time

24. Animal manure contains nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium, and is often
used to fertilize crops. See, e.g., John A.Lory, ManagingManurePhosphorusto Protect
Water Quality, Department of Agronomy and Commercial Agriculture Program,
University of Missouri-Columbia, at http://www.muextension.missouri.edu/explore/ag
guides/soils/g09182.htm (Apr. 1, 1999). Applying manure to land (land application) can
present water quality problems, especially with regard to nitrogen and phosphorus. See
id. "The progressive deterioration of water quality from overstimulation by nutrients is
called eutrophication." Id. (emphasis omitted). Numerous forms ofmanure management
can be utilized. See David Pfost et al., Beef ManureManagement Systems in Missouri,
University of Missouri-Columbia, at http://www.muextension.missouri.edu/explore/en
vqual/ eq0377.htm (Oct. 31, 2000).
Poor manure management can cause the loss of fertilizer nutrients into nearby
surface and ground waters, bacterial contamination and fish kills, harmful odors and
gases, unwanted plant growth (i.e., algae), as well as "turbidity and other undesirable
conditions in the water." Charles D. Fulhage, Reduce Environmental Problems with
ProperLandApplication ofAnimal Manure,Department of Biological and Agricultural
Engineering, University ofMissouri-Columbia, at http://www.muextension.issouri.edu/
explore/envqual/eq0201 .htm (June 30,2000). In contrast, a proper management plan can
reduce the cost of commercial fertilizers, improve production efficiency and animal
health, and protect water resources and air quality. Id. Therefore, to avoid environmental
contamination while putting animal manure to use, "[flivestock or poultry production
enterprises should have a comprehensive manure nutrient management plan." Id.
The environmental and health risks associated with the mismanagement of animal
waste are significant. The EPA says that AFOs "annually produce more than 500 million
tons of animal manure that, when improperly managed, can pose substantial risks to the
environment and public health." Standards for CAFOs, 68 Fed. Reg. 7176, 7179 (Feb.
12, 2003). Recently, the EPA adopted a rule requiring the largest CAFOs to "develop
and implement a nutrient management plan as a condition of an NPDES permit." Id.;see
also 40 C.F.R. § 122.42(e)(1) (2003) (requiring CAFO permits to include a nutrient
management plan); 40 C.F.R. § 412.4 (2003) (specifying best management practices for
the land application of manure and wastewater).
25. Bosma Dairy,305 F.3d at 951.
26. Id. at 948.
27. Id. at 948-49; Cmty. Ass'n for Restoration of the Env't v. Sid Koopman Dairy,
54 F. Supp. 2d 976, 980-82 (E.D. Wash. 1999), aff'd, 305 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2002).
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the complaint was filed there were ongoing violations with respect to: (1)
wastewater discharges from a truck wash on Bosma's property, (2)
overapplication or misapplication of animal wastewater to a nearby field, and (3)
discharges to a joint drain and nearby canal because of the operation and
maintenance of the dairies.28 However, CARE failed to prove an ongoing
violation with respect to operation without an NPDES permit and with respect
to seepage and capacity problems with Bosma's storage ponds.29
In the trial's penalty phase, Bosma was ordered to pay $171,500 in civil
penalties to the United States Treasury and $428,304 in attorney fees and costs
to CARE.3" The civil penalty represented the court's computation of the $25,000
maximum daily penalty, less appropriate reductions for certain mitigating
factors. 3' This penalty was roughly forty percent of the maximum possible under
the statute.32 After making certain adjustments to CARE's request for costs and
attorney fees, the court imposed athirty percent reduction to account for CARE's
limited success. a
Both parties appealed various aspects of the decision.34 Bosma challenged
the district court's subject matter jurisdiction by arguing that CARE failed to
provide adequate notice of its intent to sue,35 that its drainage ditch did not
constitute "waters of the United States,' 36 and that its "fields where manure is
stored and ditches therein" were not point sources. 37 Bosma argued that CARE
failed to prove any violations in connection with its truck wash, and that no
ongoing violations existed with respect to the application of wastewaters and
28. Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d at 949 (quoting Cmty. Ass'n for Restoration of the
Env't v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 65 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1134 (E.D. Wash. 1999), aff'd, 305
F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2002)).
29. Id.

30. Id.; see also Cmty. Ass'n for Restoration of the Env't v. Henry Bosma Dairy,
No. CY-98-301 1,2001 WL 1704240, at *22 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 27,2001), aff'd, 305 F.3d
943 (9th Cir. 2002).
31. Bosma Dairy,2001 WL 1704240, at *7-16. The court followed the "top down"
analysis of beginning with the maximum penalty and using the statutory factors to make
any necessary reductions. Id. at *8 (citing Clean Water Act § 309(d), 33 U.S.C. §
1319(d) (2000)). Bosma was entitled to no leniency based on the "seriousness of the
violation[s]," the "economic benefit of violations," or the economic impact on Bosma.
Id. at *8-15. However, the court imposed less than the maximum statutory penalty
because of Bosma's "substantial and expensive" improvements, its "good faith efforts
to comply" with certain requirements, and the "heavy precipitation" that slowed Bosma's
progress one winter. Id. at *11-15.
32. Id. at *16.
33. Id. at *21.
34. Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d at 949.
35. Id. at 949-53.
36. Id. at 954-55.
37. Id. at 955.
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other discharges. 3a Bosma also argued that CARE lacked standing to enforce
state imposed standards and that the court's award of attorney fees should be
further reduced because of CARE's partial success.3 9
CARE disputed the amount of the award for civil penalties and attorney
fees, contending that it offered sufficient proof that Bosma "applied manure to
frozen ground," admitted six 1997 violations, and had three more violations
during the 1997 summer.4 ° CARE further disagreed with the district court's
partial award of attorney fees, arguing that its partial success did not render a full
award excessive.4'
On appeal, the court focused on two "central" issues: (1) the adequacy of
CARE's notice, and (2) the existence of ongoing violations. It found the parties'
other arguments to have "little merit" and addressed them very briefly. 42 The
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in all respects. It held that
when a citizen's CWA complaint includes additional violations not identified in
the notice of intent to sue, the notice will be deemed adequate if it contains all
information specifically required by law and if the additional violations are
"sufficiently similar" to those in the notice by (1) originating from the same
source, (2) being of the same nature or type, and (3) being easily identifiable in
terms of the time frame and specific location involved. As for the existence of
ongoing violations, the court found no error in the district court's rulings."
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Congress enacted the CWA, 5 sometimes called the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, in 1972.46 Its stated goals include restoring and maintaining "the
' As noted
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."47
above, the CWA generally prohibits pollutant discharges from point sources into
48
navigable waters unless the discharger has obtained an NPDES permit.
NPDES permits incorporate effluent limitations that allow discharges only below
38. Id. at 953-54.
39. Id. at 956.
40. Id.
41. Id.

42. Id. at 946 n. 1.
43. Id. at 951-53.
44. Id. at 953-54.

45. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
46. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167,
174 (2000).
47. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49,52
(1987) (citing Clean Water Act § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982)).
48. See, e.g., Ass'n to Protect Hammersley, Eld, and Totten Inlets v. Taylor, 299
F.3d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 2002).
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certain specified thresholds.49 Further, the CWA contains a citizen suit provision
that allows private parties to file suit and enforce the CWA when the appropriate
government agencies fail to do so."
A. JurisdictionalWaters of the CWA
The term "navigable waters" is defined in the CWA as "waters of the
United States"'" and is not limited to those waters which are in fact navigable in
the traditional sense."2 The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") has
further defined such waters by regulation to include tributaries of other water
bodies subject to the CWA.5" Several federal circuits, including the Ninth
Circuit, have affirmed CWA jurisdiction over tributaries. 4 The jurisdictional
reach of the CWA even extends to irrigation canals and other "tributaries that
flow intermittently.""
B. Point Sources
The CWA defines a "pollutant discharge" as "any addition of any pollutant
to navigable waters from any point source."5. "Point sources" are further defined
as "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited
to any ... concentrated animal feeding operation ... from which pollutants are
or may be discharged."57 Thus, CAFOs are explicitly included as point sources.
However, "agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated

49. Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d at 946; see also Clean Water Act § 402(a), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(a) (2000). Effluent limitations are further described in Section 301. See Clean
Water Act § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2000).
50. See Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000); infra notes 64-73 and
accompanying text.
51. Clean Water Act § 502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000); Solid Waste Agency
of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 163 (2001).
52. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 167.
53. 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2002) (defining terms related to NPDES permits,
specifically Subpart (e) of the definition for "Waters of the United States"). The Army
Corps of Engineers has a similar, but not identical definition which applies to its Section
404 permit program for dredged or fill material. See Clean Water Act § 404, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1344 (2000); 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(5) (2002).
54. See Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 533 (9th Cir.
2001); United States v. TGR Corp., 171 F.3d 762, 764 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v.
Eidson, 108 F.3d 1336, 1341-42 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Tex. Pipe Line Co.,
611 F.2d 345, 347 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504
F.2d 1317, 1325 (6th Cir. 1974).
55. Headwaters,243 F.3d at 533-34.
56. Clean Water Act § 502(12), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2000).
57. Id. § 502(14).
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agriculture" are expressly exempted from coverage, 8 so the argument remains
open as to whether parts of CAFOs (i.e., crop production fields) can meet this
agricultural exemption. 9
C. Enforcement of the Clean Water Act and Citizen Suits
Enforcement of the CWA has been characterized as "a partnership between
the States and the Federal Government."6 ° States have the option of regulating
their own citizens (subject to certain federal requirements) or allowing the EPA
to directly administer the program." Under the delegated approach, the EPA
promulgates the minimum set of "effluent limitations" that states must
incorporate into their NPDES permits and also assists the states in adopting
supplemental "water quality standards" as a type of safety-net.62 The state of
Washington administers its own NPDES permit program through WADOE."3
When the government fails to take proper enforcement action," citizens can
act as "private attorneys general"' and sue violators to enforce NPDES permit
limitations pursuant to Section 505 of the CWA. 6 Citizens can enforce not only

58. Id.
59. See infra notes 157-63 and accompanying text. As the district court pointed
out, efforts to amend the CWA to exempt land application of livestock manure from the
definition of a point source were unsuccessful. See Cmty. Ass'n for Restoration of the
Env't v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 65 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1136 (E.D. Wash. 1999), aff'd, 305
F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2002).
60. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 101 (1992).
61. See Clean Water Act § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2000); Arkansas,503 U.S.
at 101.
62. Arkansas, 503 U.S. at 101-02.
63. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.64.050(1)(d)-(e), 90.64.050(2) (Supp. 2003); Bosma
Dairy,65 F. Supp. 2d at 1136-37. Washington's local conservation districts also retain
certain enumerated duties, which include providing technical assistance and referring
complaints. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.64.070(1) (Supp. 2003); Bosma Dairy,65 F. Supp.
2d at 1137. In Missouri, the NPDES permit program is administered through the
Department of Natural Resources. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 640.010 (2000) (creating the
Department); id. §§ 644.006-.150 (2000) (Missouri Clean Water Law).
64. Citizen suits are actually barred when the government is diligently pursuing
enforcement action. Clean Water Act § 505(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (2000);
see also Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 60
(1987) ("The bar on citizen suits when governmental enforcement action is under way
suggests that the citizen suit is meant to supplement rather than to supplant governmental
action.").
65. See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 165 (1997); Trafficante v. Metro. Life
Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972); Ashoffv. City of Ukiah, 130 F.3d 409, 413 n.4 (9th
Cir. 1997); EPA v. City of Green Forest, Ark., 921 F.2d 1394, 1403 (8th Cir. 1990).
66. Clean Water Act § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2000); see, e.g., Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 174-75 (2000). In this
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federal limitations, but also more stringent state standards incorporated into the
permit.67 Successful citizen plaintiffs may be entitled to injunctive relief and
litigation costs, while any civil penalties ordered by the court must be paid to the
United States Treasury.68
However, there are important limitations of which citizens must be aware.
The United States Supreme Court interpreted the "to be in violation of'
language 69 in the CWA's citizen suit provision to mean that citizens may not sue
alleged violators for "wholly past violations."7 In other words, an "ongoing
violation" is required, and citizens must allege a "continuous or intermittent
violation."'" Lower courts have noted two ways of meeting this requirement: (1)
proving that a certain violation continues, or (2) convincing the court that
intermittent or sporadic violations are likely to recur.7 ' When a citizen relies on

context the term "citizen" includes "persons having an interest which is or may be
adversely affected." Clean Water Act § 505(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (2000).
67. EPA v. California, 426 U.S. 200, 224 (1976) (the statutory language makes
"clear that all dischargers (including federal dischargers) may be sued to enforce permit
conditions, whether those conditions arise from standards and limitations promulgated
by the [EPA] Administrator or from stricter standards established bythe State"); see also
Ashoff, 130 F.3d at 412-13.
68. See Clean Water Act § 505(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (2000) ("The court ...
may
award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any
...substantially prevailing party, whenever the court determines such award is
appropriate."); Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 53 ("If the citizen prevails in such an action, the
court may order injunctive relief and/or impose civil penalties payable to the United
States Treasury.").
69. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 56-58. The relevant part of the citizen suit provision
declares: "Except as provided... any citizen may commence a civil action on his own
behalf.., against any person ... who is alleged to be in violation of(A) an effluent
standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order issued ...with respect to such
a standard or limitation." Clean Water Act § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2000)
(emphasis added). The Gwaltney Court stated that "[t]he most natural reading of 'to be
in violation' is a requirement that citizen-plaintiffs allege a state of either continuous or
intermittent violation-that is, a reasonable likelihood that a past polluter will continue
to pollute in the future." Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 57 (emphasis added).
70. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 64.
71. See id. at 64-66 (emphasis added).
72. Sierra Club v. Union Oil Co., 853 F.2d 667,671 (9th Cir. 1988). In the court's
own words, "a citizen plaintiff may prove ongoing violations 'either (1) by proving
violations that continue on or after the date the complaint is filed, or (2) by adducing
evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find a continuing likelihood of a
recurrence in intermittent or sporadic violations."' Id. (quoting Chesapeake Bay Found.,
Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 844 F.2d 170, 171-72 (4th Cir. 1988); see also EPA
v. City of Green Forest, Ark., 921 F.2d 1394, 1406 (8th Cir. 1990) (affirmingjurisdiction
of district court, which found "good-faith allegations of ongoing violations" and a
"reasonable likelihood of a recurrence of intermittent violations") (citations omitted).
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intermittent or sporadic violations, the violations
are considered ongoing until
73
"there is no real likelihood of repetition."
Additionally, these "would-be plaintiffls]" must notify the EPA, the state,
and the alleged violator at least sixty days before filing suit.74 If the state or the
EPA brings an enforcement action against the violator within this period, the
citizen suit is barred.75 Thus, citizen suits were designed to "supplement rather
than to supplant governmental action."76 The United States Supreme Court has
characterized the purpose of this "notice and delay" requirement as "obviating
the need for citizen suits" by (1) allowing the government "to take responsibility
for enforcing environmental regulations" and (2) giving the defendant a chance
to achieve complete compliance with the law."
D. Contents of Notice and the "Additional Violations" Problem
In Hallstromv. Tillamook County, the United States Supreme Court strictly
construed a notice requirement similar to the one in the CWA and found that
dismissal of a citizen suit was required after the plaintiffs failed to notify the
EPA and the state of their intent to sue." The Court refused to allow equitable
and practical considerations to trump clear statutory language regarding the
timing of notice," but did not address the content of the notice."0

73. Sierra Club, 853 F.2d at 671 (quoting Chesapeake Bay Found., 844 F.2d at

171-72).
74. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167,
174-75 (2000) (citing Clean Water Act § 505(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A)
(2000)). The Second Circuit has begun to refer to such notice letters as "NOI letter[s]."
Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273 F.3d 481,
485 (2d Cir. 2001).
75. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 59-60 (citing Clean Water Act § 505(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(b)(1)(B) (2000)). Lower courts have found that an investigation or an
administrative compliance order does not prevent the citizen suit. See Proffitt v.
Township of Bristol, 754 F.2d 504, 507 (3d Cir. 1985).
76. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60.
77. Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 29 (1989) (citing Gwaltney, 484
U.S. at 60).
78. Id. at 31 (holding "that the notice and 60-day delay requirements are mandatory
conditions precedent to commencing suit under the [Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act's] citizen suit provision"). The court specifically left open the question of
whether the notice and delay requirements were "jurisdictional in the strict sense of the
term." Id. Other courts have interpreted such requirements as jurisdictional. See Cmty.
Ass'n for Restoration of the Env't v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d 943, 950 (9th Cir.
2002) ("[In Hallstrom, the Court held that the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction.").
79. See Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 27-31.
80. See Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Stroh Die Casting Co., 116 F.3d 814, 819
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The CWA itself does not describe what the notice should contain, but it
instructs the EPA to promulgate regulations addressing notice requirements."
The EPA's regulation requires that the notice:
include sufficient informationtopermit the recipientto identify [1] the
specific standard, limitation, or order alleged . . . to constitute a

violation, [2] the person or persons responsible for the alleged
violation,. . . [3] the date or dates of such violation, and [4] the full
2
name, address, and telephone number of the person giving notice.1
Thus, citizen plaintiffs must identify the (1) violations, (2) violators, (3) time
frame, and (4) complainants. Despite this guidance, courts have struggled to
address the requisite content ofpre-suit notices.8 3 Commentators have discerned
two basic approaches: "strict construction" and the more liberal "overall
sufficiency." 4 Courts in the former group have extended Hallstrom'srationale
to the EPA regulations and carefully examine each requirement," while those in
the latter category have interpreted the "sufficient information" language in the
regulation to allow a standard more generous to citizen plaintiffs.8 6
The Ninth Circuit appeared to take the strict approach in 1995.7 By
interpreting Hallstrom to mandate strict compliance with the EPA regulation, it
dismissed a citizen suit because of the plaintiffs' failure to include all their
identities, addresses, and phone numbers. 8 Additionally, the Middle District of
Alabama explicitly adopted the "strict interpretive approach" after surveying
several other cases.8 9 It found the plaintiff's notice inadequate because of failure

(7th Cir. 1997).

81. Clean Water Act § 505(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (2000) ("Notice under this
subsection shall be given in such manner as the [EPA] Administrator shall prescribe by
regulation."); Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d at 950.
82. 40 C.F.R. § 135.3(a) (2002) (emphasis added).
83. See Robin Kundis Craig, Notice Letters and Notice Pleading: The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedureand the Sufficiency of Environmental Citizen Suit Notice, 78
OR. L. REV. 105, 143 (1999).
84. Id. at 143-46.

85. Id.; see, e.g., Wash. Trout v. McCain Foods, Inc., 45 F.3d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir.
1995) (dismissing CWA suit due to failure to identify all plaintiffs); Atwell v. KW
Plastics Recycling Div., 173 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1222 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (strictly
interpreting notice requirement).
86. Craig, supranote 83, at 143. Professor Craig includes the Third and Seventh
Circuits in this category. Id. at 144-45.
87. See Wash. Trout, 45 F.3d at 1355.

88. Id. This has been termed a rejection of the "tag along plaintiff' rule. See
Craig, supranote 83, at 133.
89. Atwell, 173 F. Supp. 2d at 1221.
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to prove the "required connection" between (1) reporting and monitoring

violations and (2) previously noticed discharge violations.9"
Various decisions have been associated with the more liberal "overall
sufficiency" approach. The Seventh Circuit has stated that "notice must be
sufficiently specific to inform the alleged violator about what it is doing wrong,
so that it will know what corrective actions will avert a lawsuit.""' It found that
notice of violations occurring at one outfall92 was sufficient when the defendant
later redirected its effluent to another outfall. 93
Perhaps the most notable case in the overall sufficiency category is Public
Interest Research Group ofNew Jersey, Inc. v. Hercules, Inc., where the Third
Circuit focused on whether notice gave the alleged violator "enough information
to be able to bring itself into compliance."9' 4 The court stated that citizens need
not "list every specific aspect or detail," nor "describe every ramification" of
each alleged violation.95 But it read the EPA's notice regulation to require
enough information that the recipient could identify the specific discharge
limitation violated, the parameter 6 and outfall involved, the date of the violation,
and the persons involved.97
Hercules also marked the first federal circuit ruling that squarely addressed
the adequacy of pre-suit notices that fail to list additional violations later
incorporated into the complaint.98 It held that a citizen's initial notice of intent
to sue for discharge violations was sufficiently broad to allow other violations

90. Id. at 1223-25.
91. At. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Stroh Die Casting Co., 116 F.3d 814, 819 (7th
Cir. 1997).
92. Basically, an outfall is "[t]he place where effluent is discharged into receiving
waters."
Terms of the Environment, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, at
http://www.epa.gov/OCEPAterms/ (last modified Dec. 30,2002). The EPA's regulations
define it more specifically only with respect to storm water discharges. See 40 C.F.R. §
122.26(b)(9) (2002). Judging by the agency's own forms, the EPA apparently considers
the term "outfall" to be synonymous with "point source." See U.S. Pub. Interest
Research Group v. Heritage Salmon, Inc., No. CIV. 00-150-B-C, 2002 WL 240440, at
*14 n.22, (D. Me. Feb. 19, 2002).
93. Ad. States, 116 F.3d at 820. Despite the dissent's objections, the court refused
to adopt "an inflexible rule that would require outfall-by-outfall notice in all cases." Id.
94. Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Hercules, Inc., 50 F.3d 1239,
1248-49 (3d Cir. 1995).
95. Id. at 1248.
96. The EPA's online glossary defines "parameter" as a "variable, measurable
propertywhose value is a determinant ofthe characteristics of a system; e.g., temperature,
pressure, and density are parameters of the atmosphere." Terms of the Environment,
supranote 92.
97. Hercules, 50 F.3d at 1248.
98. Cmty. Ass'n for Restoration of the Env't v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d 943,
950-51 (9th Cir. 2002).
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of the "same type" that occurred both during and after those in the notice letter.99
While the similar violations at issue in Hercules were other discharges and
related monitoring, reporting, and record keeping violations, the court repeatedly
stressed that "same type" included the "same parameter, same outfall, [and] same
time period" as violations in the notice. °°
The Eighth Circuit briefly addressed the "additional violations" issue,
agreeing with Herculesthat citizen suits are "limited to violations that are closely
related to and of the same type as the violations specified in the notice of intent
to sue."'
It is important to note that while the strict-liberal distinction can be
useful and has been cited by courts,"°2 the cases do not always fit neatly into
these categories.'0 3

99. Hercules, 50 F.3d at 1250.
100. Id. at 1253; see also id. at 1250.
101. Comfort Lake Ass'n v. Dresel Contracting, Inc., 138 F.3d 351, 355 (8th Cir.
1998) (finding that failure to obtain NPDES permit for three settling ponds, and probable
violations at defendants' other sites were "not proper subjects of the lawsuit" because
plaintiff's notice only alleged permit violations relating to store construction).
102. See, e.g., Atwell v. KW Plastics Recycling Div., 173 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 121718 (M.D. Ala. 2001).
103. Hercules' approach allows non-noticed violations of the "same parameter,
same outfall, [and] same time period" as noticed violations. Hercules, 50 F.3d at 1253.
However, this test could potentially be quite strict if interpreted literally, especially
considering that the EPA regulation does not speak directly to identifying the offending
outfall. See 40 C.F.R § 135.3(a) (2002). Indeed, the Seventh Circuit refused to read
Hercules as establishing "an inflexible rule that would require outfall-by-outfall notice
in all cases." At. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Stroh Die Casting Co., 116 F.3d 814, 820
(7th Cir. 1997). Since the court believed the polluter simply redirected its waste stream
to another outfall, it decided the original notice was sufficient. Id. One of the judges
disagreed, however, viewing Hercules as "a workable, bright-line rule" that requires
identification of each outfall involved. Id. at 824 (Manion, J.,
dissenting). Read this
way, Hercules hardly represents an "overall sufficiency" approach.
The Second Circuit has cited Hercules for the proposition that a notice letter must
identify each separate pollutant involved in the alleged CWA violations. Catskill
Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273 F.3d 481,487 (2d
Cir. 2001). It found the plaintiffs' notice (which alleged problems with total suspended
solids and settleable solids) sufficient with regard to turbidity and suspended solids, but
insufficient with respect to thermal discharges (increased water temperature). Id. at 48689. The court focused on whether the discharges were logically dependent on each other,
and decided that the relationship between temperature and suspended solids was not close
enough despite their "frequent association under ordinary circumstances." Id. at 489.
The Ninth Circuit's own opinions indicate a lack of clarity about the approach it
prefers. In the instant case it proclaimed to follow a strict construction approach, but
discussed the overall sufficiency method at length. Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d at 951. A
subsequent decision repeats this recital, first pointing to strict construction but later
requiring "no more than 'reasonable specificity."' San Francisco Baykeeper, Inc. v.
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E. Awards of Attorney Fees to Citizen Plaintiffs
The CWA also gives judges discretion to award costs and fees to a citizenplaintiff who qualifies as a "substantially prevailing party."'' The assessment
of reasonable attorney fees can include an adjustment for the "results obtained"
when a plaintiff is only partially successful. 0 5 In making this adjustment, the
court must consider (1) whether the unsuccessful claims were related to the
successful claims, and (2) whether the hours expended are an appropriate basis
for the award given the plaintiff's overall level of success. 6 Even if some
claims fail, time spent on those claims may be compensable, in full or in part, if
they contribute to other successful claims." 7 Using its equitable judgment, the
court has discretion to either "attempt to identify specific hours that should be
eliminated, or it may simply reduce the award to account for the limited
108
success."'
IV. INSTANT DECISION

In Bosma Dairy, the Ninth Circuit began by framing the "two central
issues" in the case as follows:
First, we must determine whether under the citizen suit provision of
the [CWA,] the plaintiffs' 60-day notice letter adequately notified the
defendants of alleged violations. Second, we must determine whether
the district court erred by concluding that ongoing violations existed.

Tosco Co., 309 F.3d 1153, 1157-58 (9th Cir. 2002). Possibly this means that the court
will require strict compliance only with certain requirements, such as the plaintiffs' own
identities and contact information. See id. (citing Wash. Trout v. McCain Foods, Inc.,
45 F.3d 1351, 1355 (9th Cir. 1995)).
104. Clean Water Act § 505(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (2000) ("The court, in issuing
any final order in any action brought pursuant to this section, may award costs of
litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any prevailing or
substantially prevailing party, whenever the court determines such award is
appropriate.") (emphasis added).
105. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983) (setting the standard for
fee awards under federal civil rights statute). The Supreme Court noted that the
"standards set forth in this opinion are generally applicable in all cases in which Congress
has authorized an award of fees to a 'prevailing party."' Id. at 433 n.7; see also Thorne
v. City of El Segundo, 802 F.2d 1131, 1140-41 (9th Cir. 1986) (adopting the Hensley
approach).
106. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.
107. Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 935 F.2d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 1991).
108. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436-37.
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The district court resolved both questions in favor of the plaintiffs and
imposed penalties for 16 proved violations.0 9
After providing some background information about the facts and procedural
history, the court began its discussion of CARE's notice.
The court pointed out its de novo standard of review with regard to the
adequacy of the notice, laid out the statutory and regulatory notice requirements,
and then discussed relevant case law.11 It described how the United States
Supreme Court began a trend of strictly construing explicit requirements for
notice in environmental statutes, but that some courts had been less demanding
when it came to the content of otherwise valid notices.' The court discussed
the Third Circuit's "overall sufficiency" approach at length." 2 After noting its
own adherence to "the rule of 'strict compliance,"' the court indicated that the
"key language in the notice regulation is the phrase 'sufficient information to
permit the recipient to identify' the alleged violations and bring itself into
compliance."" 3
The court found that CARE's notice contained everything mandated by the
EPA regulation." 4 After enumerating the violations contained in the original
notice and those added later in Appendix B, the court pointed out that CARE's
notice letter provided Bosma with a "range of dates during which the violations
later listed in Appendix B occurred.""' The court noted that both sets of
violations involved the same source (two dairies that milk cows in a confined
space), the same waste material (manure), and a "small, identifiable strip" of the
same outfall (a single drainage ditch)." 6 Additionally, the court observed that
Bosma's extensive history of problems with WADOE "made both parties acutely
aware of the location and course of [the drainage ditch]."" 7
The court viewed the purpose of the sixty-day notice as providing the
agencies and the defendant with information regarding the cause and type of
alleged violations, so allowing CARE to include the Appendix B violations did
not "undermine the purpose of the citizen suit provision or the [EPA]

109. Cmty. Ass'n for Restoration of the Env't v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d
943, 946 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
110. Id. at 949-50. This standard of review was well settled in the Ninth Circuit.
See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Southwest Marine, Inc., 236 F.3d 985, 996 (9th
Cir. 2000).
111. Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d at 950-51.

112. Id. at 950-53.
113. Id. at 951.
114. Id.

115. Id. at 951-52.
116. Id. at 952.
117. Id.
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requirements.""' Therefore, CARE's notice provided Bosma and the relevant
agencies with "sufficient detail" and the violations listed in Appendix B were
"sufficiently similar" to those in the notice." 9
The court then recited the standard of review in the Ninth Circuit with
regard to the existence of ongoing violations: findings of fact are reviewed for
clear error while conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.' The court first
dealt with Bosma's argument that no ongoing violations existed at its truck wash
because it capped the drain shortly after the complaint was filed.'' Because
Bosma had not proven that the drain was capped, and because the district court
was reluctant to believe that Bosma fixed it without notifying the person
22
monitoring the compliance efforts, the ruling was not clearly erroneous.'
Second, because residents had testified about seeing the application of manure
wastewater to the field and the resulting spills into a nearby canal, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the finding of ongoing violations with respect to wastewater
application.'2 3 Bosma's argument regarding discharges to the drainage ditch met
a similar fate. Given Bosma's history of repeat violations, the poor maintenance
and operation of the dairies, and evidence of further problems even after CARE
filed suit, the district court's finding of a likelihood of recurring violations was
justifiable. 4
The court then turned to the parties' less meritorious arguments, addressing
each in turn. First was Bosma's argument that the joint drainage ditch was not
subject to regulation under the CWA. Since the Yakima River undisputedly fell
within the definition of "waters of the United States," testimony that the drainage
ditch eventually empties into the Yakima River by one of two possible routes
was sufficient to uphold the district court's ruling. 2
Bosma's next argument was that its manure storage fields were not part of
the CAFO and thus not a point source covered by the CWA. 26 The court noted
that agricultural waste is considered a pollutant under the CWA when it is
discharged into water,'27 and that Bosma failed to show that it qualified for any
agricultural point source exception. 2 ' It then cited the Second Circuit for the

118. Id. at 952-53.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 952.
Id. at 953.
Id. at 953-54.
Id. at 954.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 954-55.
Id. at 955.

127. Id. (citing Clean Water Act § 502(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2000)) ("The term
'pollutant' means ... agricultural waste discharged into water.")).
128. Id. at 955-56.
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propositions that the definition of a point source should be broadly construed,' 29
and that "liquid manure spreading operations are a point source within the
meaning of [the CWA] because the farm itself falls within the definition of [a]
CAFO and is not subject to the agricultural exemption. " "' Given the CWA's
purpose of controlling pollutant discharges to restore and maintain the nation's
waters, the court concluded that a CAFO includes "any manure spreading
manure storing fields, and ditches used to store or transfer the
vehicles,...
31
waste."1
The court was similarly unimpressed with Bosma's argument that CARE
lacked standing to enforce state requirements. Finding Bosma's permit to be a
combined permit that incorporated both state and federal requirements, the Ninth
Circuit went on to reaffirm its previous decision "that the CWA allows citizen
suits to enforce more stringent state standards."' Therefore, CARE had
standing to enforce violations of both federal and state standards incorporated
into Bosma's permit and waste management plan.'
The court next addressed Bosma's argument that the violations CARE
successfully proved were unrelated to its unsuccessful claims, thus making a
further reduction in the award appropriate.' Since CARE's claims all shared
similar facts, legal theories, and focused on "a single course of conduct by
percent. 35
Bosma," the court found no error in reducing the fee award by thirty
36
CARE's cross-appeal on two other minor issues was also denied.
V. COMMENT
A. Notice
The amount of information that citizen plaintiffs are required to provide in
their notice of intent to sue has proven to be a difficult issue for federal courts.
Different jurisdictions have required varying degrees of specificity. Following
Hallstrom's rationale, the Ninth Circuit had historically taken a very strict
approach with the items listed in the EPA's notice regulation.' 37 But Bosma

129. Id. (citing Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1354 (2d Cir. 1991)).
130. Id. at 955 (quoting Concerned Area Residents for the Env't v. Southview
Farm, 34 F.3d 114, 115 (2d Cir. 1994)) (citations omitted).
131. Id.

132. Id. at 956 (citing Ashoffv. City of Ukiah, 130 F.3d 409,413 (9th Cir. 1997)).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.

136. The court affirmed that civil penalties were properly denied for three sets of
violations which CARE simply failed to prove, and that the reduced fee award adequately
reflected CARE's partial success. Id. at 956-57.
137. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
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Dairy, which relied heavily on the Third Circuit's more forgiving approach,
arguably marks the Ninth Circuit's movement toward a more liberal and relaxed
standard more favorable to citizen plaintiffs. Although the court continued to
proclaim its adherence to the "rule of 'strict compliance,"' it discussed the Third
Circuit's "overall sufficiency" approach at length and indicated a new focus on
the "sufficient information to ... identify the... violation" language in the EPA
regulation.'38
The basic policy behind citizen suits is to encourage enforcement of
environmental laws, but Congress was also concerned with overburdening the
federal courts. 39 Hence the notice and delay prerequisite, and the requirement
of ongoing violations. Since the notice and delay requirement serves to spur
either agency enforcement or voluntary compliance, 4" it makes sense that
citizens must provide enough information to make one of these two alternatives
possible. As a matter of fairness, the defendant needs to know what problems
need to be solved. But imposing an insurmountable informational burden on
citizen plaintiffs (without the benefit of discovery). 4' contravenes both the text 42
and the purpose 43 of the EPA regulation. Additional reasons for courts to be
receptive to citizen suits include the equitable nature of allowing affected
citizens to ensure compliance, and the fact that citizens stand to gain nothing
from their efforts other than attorney fees and compliance itself.'"
While the court failed to discuss the precise contents of CARE's notice, it
found the notice to be proper with respect to the originally noticed violations 45
and then turned to the "additional violations" question. The hypothetical

138. Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d at 951.
139. Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 29 (1989).

140. Id. (citing Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484
U.S. 49, 60 (1987)).
141. See Craig, supra note 83, at 199 (concluding that imposing strict notice
requirements can undermine the notice pleading standard of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
142. Recall the regulation's "sufficient information to . . . identify the ...
violation" language. 40 C.F.R. § 135.3(a) (2002).
143. As Professor Craig points out, legislative history in both the Senate and the
House of Representatives stated that EPA regulations should not place "unnecessary" or
"impossible" burdens on citizen plaintiffs. Craig, supra note 83, at 200-01. Further,
recall that the purpose of the notice and delay period is to achieve (1) governmental
enforcement or (2)voluntarily compliance. Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 29. Neither of these
requires perfect knowledge regarding every aspect of a violation. Citizens should be able
to proceed as long as the government and the defendant are able to identify the violations,
violators, time frame, and complainants. See 40 C.F.R. § 135.3(a) (2002).
144. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
145. See Cmty. Ass'n for Restoration of the Env't v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d

943, 951 (9th Cir. 2002) ("CARE's notice included all of the information required by the
EPA regulations.").
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example borrowed from Hercules illustrates the court's simple logic that if a
citizen fails to give notice for one out of five violations, "[w]hether the agency
or the permit holder is informed of four or five excess discharges of pollutant 'x'
will probably make no difference in a decision to bring about compliance.""'
One might argue that the hypothetical four out of five violations is quantitatively
a very different ratio than the twelve out of forty-four at issue in Bosma Dairy."7
However, the EPA regulation says nothing about identifying a certain number
or percent of the ultimately discovered violations. The judicial construction of
a percentage limitation would seem to be arbitrary and unnecessary, especially
when the plaintiff successfully identifies the parameter, outfall, and time frame
involved. Furthermore, it seems counterproductive to increase the burden on
plaintiffs when they discover much greater environmental contamination than
originally anticipated.
Requiring additional allegations of violations to involve the same time
frame as violations in the notice is consistent with the text of the EPA
regulation"" and helps ensure that the same course of action by the polluter is
targeted. Moreover, the time frame limitation is significant because it prevents
citizens from piggybacking a new and different set of violations onto the original
enforcement action (this would increase the likelihood of surprise).
Additionally, if a longer time span is involved and a history of violations is
brought to the attention of state officials, then the state might consider the
violator a more serious offender and become actively involved in the
enforcement efforts itself.
The "same nature" requirement is similarly associated with both the
seriousness"9 of the violations and the defendant's ability to identify" the
problem. Both of these considerations could impact either a decision to bring
about compliance voluntarily, or an agency's decision to pursue enforcement
action.

146. Id. at 953 (citing Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Hercules, Inc.,
50 F.3d 1239, 1248 (3d Cir. 1995)).
147. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
148. Recall that the regulation requires a citizen's notice to "include sufficient

information to permit the recipient to identify... the date or dates of such violation."
40 C.F.R. § 135.3(a) (2002).
149. Absent a "same nature" requirement, the plaintiff could include vastly
different violations in its eventual lawsuit, and both the defendant and the government
might fail to act because of a failure to grasp the severity of the problem.
150. Requiring violations to be of the same nature makes them easier to identify

because in theory, plaintiffs complaint about pollutant X at location #1 does not
necessarily inform the defendant about pollutant Ywhich might be discharged at location
#2. Requiring readily identifiable violations also makes agency enforcement easier to
pursue, and thus more likely to occur.
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Bosma Dairy allows citizen plaintiffs some leeway with regard to the
content of their notice of intent to sue by allowing them to include additional
violations (of the same nature, source, and time frame) without further
procedural hassle and delay.' This means defendants will be unable to rely
solely on the notice letter to determine the violations for which they could be
held responsible. But due to the similarity and time frame limitations,'52 and the
Ninth Circuit's likelihood of remaining quite strict about other aspects of the
EPA regulation,' 53 it remains unlikely that any defendant will truly be taken by
surprise. With one less procedural battle to deal with, hopefully citizen plaintiffs
can address the merits and help ensure that the CWA is enforced.
Even when a notice letter is found inadequate, the citizen plaintiff may be
able to rectify the problem by (1) providing a supplemental notice conforming
to the court's expectations and (2) amending the original complaint. 5 4 Indeed,
the district court would have allowed CARE to cure part of its notice in this way,
but after providing supplemental notice of claims relating to a nearby location,
CARE failed to amend its complaint to include those violations.' Of course,
a second notice triggers a new sixty-day delay period, and by that time the citizen
may lose the ability to take part in enforcement because either the defendant or
the government finally decides to act. But by that time, at least, the problem is
solved (in theory) and the citizen suit has fulfilled its function.

151. See Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d at 952-53.

152. The Ninth Circuit further elucidated the time frame limitation in a more recent
case. See San Francisco Baykeeper, Inc. v. Tosco Co., 309 F.3d 1153, 1155 (9th Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 2296 (2003) (holding "that as long as a notice letter is
reasonablyspecific as to the nature and time of the alleged violations, the plaintiff has
fulfilled the notice requirement") (emphasis added).
153. The Ninth Circuit continues to cite Washington Trout for its dismissal of a
citizen suit due to failure to include the identity and contact information of each plaintiff.
See Baykeeper, 309 F.3d at 1157-58.

154. The United States Supreme Court acknowledged that dismissing a suit for
inadequate notice will not deprive plaintiffs of their day in court, since they "remain free
to give notice and file their suit in compliance with the statute to enforce pertinent

environmental standards." Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 32 (1989).
Indeed, it may prove wise to adopt a "better-safe-than-sorry" approach, and provide a
second notice anytime the lawsuit begins to deviate from the original notice. The Third

Circuit noted approval for this approach, which would allow plaintiffs to amend their
original complaint and include newly-noticed items, or to consolidate the original action

with a second lawsuit stemming from additional violations. See Pub. Interest Research
Group of N.J., Inc. v. Hercules, Inc., 50 F.3d 1239, 1252 n.15 (3d Cir. 1995).
155. See Cmty. Ass'n for Restoration of the Env't v.Henry Bosma Dairy, 65 F.
Supp. 2d 1129, 1152-53 (E.D. Wash. 1999), aff'd, 305 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2002).
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B. Other Enforcement Issues
As CAFOs attempt to avoid environmental liability, the exact boundaries
of the terms "waters of the United States" and "point source" continue to evolve.
Bosma Dairy reafflrms the notion that irrigation canals and drainage ditches can
6
be subject to the CWA when they empty into other waters of the United States.'1
While it is beyond dispute that CAFOs are point sources generally, the precise
extent of that coverage has not been fully explored. For instance, at some large
scale operations it may be difficult to determine where the "containment area"
ends and the crop production fields (which may meet an agricultural exemption
and be considered a non-point source) begin.'57
The Ninth Circuit left open the question as to whether a more distant part
of the CAFO could fall within an agricultural exemption.' 58 The district court's
opinion had rejected the broadest possible interpretation of CAFO boundaries,
noting that the point source exception for irrigated runoff must apply to
something (namely, crop production fields)."" Its formulation would, however,
consider any discharges caused by wastewater overapplication to be CWA
violations. 60 The Ninth Circuit was wise to avoid elaborating on this subject at
length in Bosma Dairy, given the amount of evidence regarding Bosma's poor
land application practices. The court did leave the door open for future
argument, but it adopted the Second Circuit's broad interpretation of the term
"point source" and properly left the burden on Bosma to show that it met an
exception.' 6' Even so, the whole argument could become much less important
62
depending on how the EPA's new waste management regulations are applied.1
But for now, at least in the Ninth Circuit, manure storage fields and "ditches
used to store or transfer the waste" are included as part of the CAFO.' 63

156. Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d at 954-55.
157. See Ninth Circuit Update: CAFOs and Citizen Suits Under the CWA, Perkins

Coie, at http://www.perkinscoie.com/content/ren/updates/env/cafos.htm (last visited Oct.
4, 2003) (explaining impacts of Bosma Dairy).
158. See Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d at 955-56 (stating that Bosma merely "failed to
show that it falls within any of the agricultural point source exceptions").
159. Bosma Dairy, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 1133 (citing Clean Water Act § 502(14), 33
U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2000)).
160. Id.
161. Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d at 955-56.
162. See Standards for CAFOs, 68 Fed. Reg. 7176 (Feb. 12, 2003) (requiring
certain CAFOs to adopt nutrient management plans); 40 C.F.R. § 122.42(e)(1) (2003)
(requiring nutrient management plans to be included in CAFO permits); 40 C.F.R. §
412.4 (2003) (specifying best management practices for the land application of manure
and wastewater).
163. Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d at 955.
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Although the court only addressed the issue briefly, it reaffirmed the notion
that citizens can enforce state standards in federal court if they are incorporated
into a combined permit.'6 Some might consider this to be "piggybacking" more
stringent state standards onto federal permits, especially if state law does not
provide for citizen suits as a means of enforcement.' 65 But the ability to enforce
state standards under the CWA is in harmony with its scheme of federal-state
67
partnership'66 and cooperation, and is further supported by precedent.'
The attorney fees provision is an essential component of citizen suits that
often makes enforcement possible. At the same time, courts have recognized the
unfairness of giving full awards to largely unsuccessful plaintiffs or completely
preventing awards for plaintiffs who merely fail to prove a few of their
allegations. 6 ' In Bosma Dairy, the Ninth Circuit appropriately deferred to the
district judge's assessment that CARE's limited success warranted a thirty
percent fee reduction. 69 Importantly, this reduction does not correspond with the
percentage of CARE's allegations it successfully proved.' 70 Especially in citizen
suits where ongoing violations are required, success is not measured in terms of
the defendant's ultimate liability, but rather in terms of the cleanup actually
achieved.
VI. CONCLUSION
The factual setting of Bosma Dairy illustrates the need for the CWA's
citizen suit provision. Despite Bosma's numerous violations and the state
agency's internal requests for enforcement action, bringing Bosma into
compliance simply never made the priority list of a state that historically "lacked
the resources to be proactive."'' Because of Bosma Dairy,citizen plaintiffs in
CWA lawsuits are more likely to avoid procedural struggles regarding the

164. Id. at 956.
165. See Ninth Circuit Update, supra note 157; CAFOs, Liabilities, and Citizen

Suits Under the CWA, Marten Law Group, at http://www.martenlaw.com/nrdcontent_
block.php3?articleid=488 (last visited Mar. 6, 2003) (discussing impacts of Bosma
Dairy).
166. See supranotes 60-62 and accompanying text.
167. See supranote 67.
168. See supranotes 104-08 and accompanying text.

169. See Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d at 956.
170. As stated by the district court, "strict proportionality between relief obtained
and attorney fees is not required." Cmty. Ass'n for Restoration of the Env't v. Henry
Bosma Dairy, No. CY-98-3011,2001 WL 1704240, at *19 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 27, 2001),
aff'd, 305 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Riverside v. Riviera, 477 U.S. 561, 574
(1986)).

171. See Cmty. Ass'n for Restoration of the Env't v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 65 F.
Supp. 2d 1129, 1149 (E.D. Wash. 1999), aff'd, 305 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2002).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2003

23

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 4 [2003], Art. 6
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 68

content of their notice of intent to sue. The Ninth Circuit's opinion may also
suggest a more sympathetic view toward citizen suits in general, and thus
potentially increased liability for CAFOs. Although CAFO owners and
operators may not appreciate such a trend, any impediment on their ability to
contaminate their surroundings'72 is a small victory for both the environment and
those who live nearby. And in parts of the nation where many of these facilities
have chosen to locate, there is much at stake.
MARTIN A. MILLER

172. See, e.g., id. at 1145 (over a two year period, water quality samples ranged
between 4.7 and 650 times the allowable level for fecal coliform at a site where
discharges flowed from Bosma and another dairy); Corporate Hogs at the Public
Trough: Premium Standard Farms, Missouri, 1999 Sierra Club Report, at
http://www.sierraclub.org/factoryfarmis/report99/premium.asp (last visited Nov. 24,2003)
(describing one company's impact on three rural counties in Missouri); Mike
Polioudakis, AFOs and CAFOs, Auburn University, at
http://www.ag.aubum.edu/BC/P5EnvFactsCAFO.html (lastvisited Mar. 7,2003) (noting
the foul odors resulting from land application of animal manure). As one professor at the
University of Missouri-Columbia has noted: "air and water are ambient, and belong to
all (public goods) and not to the first to foul them with pollution from concentrated
animal feeding operations. Neighbors to CAFOs should not have to 'put up and shut up'
with neighboring CAFOs which pollute the common waters and air." Stephen F.
Matthews, Ag Production Contracts: Freedom to Contract,Public & Private Goods,
Missouri Agricultural Law Center, University of Missouri-Columbia, at
http://www.ssu.agri.missouri.edu/faculty/Smatthews/ag_productioncontracts.htm (Oct.
15, 2001) (discussing proposals for Missouri legislation and the EPA regulation).
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